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8.1Introduction
Many aspects of corporate acquisitions received extensive in-
vestigation, but there has been little analysis of their means of financing.
This omission is notable in view of the substantial expenditures in-
volved in takeovers. An earlier paper (Franks and Harris 1986b) records
that in 1985 acquisitions represented 6 percent of the capital stock
extant in the United Kingdom. By any account these are substantial
investments whose method of financing warrants careful scrutiny. This
paper provides a detailed empirical assessment of acquisition financing.
Although a descriptive anaLysis of acquisition finance is interesting
in itself, there are more fundamental reasons for pursuing the subject.
Over the past few years several theories of acquisition finance have
appeared. As in other areas of research on corporate finance, these
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theories have emphasized the influence of taxation and information 8.2.1
asymmetries. To date, however, little empirical work has examined
their validity. An examination of these theories may be of value not I. J
only in understanding the acquisition process but also in assessing the equity
relevance of information and tax considerations to more general issues betwe
of corporate capital structure. aeqi
We have chosen to make international comparisons between the 2. 1
United States and the United Kingdom in the analysis that follows In pat
because there are well-documented differences between the two coun- 0 ers
tries in the response of share prices to the announcement of new issues
of equity. One interesting question is whether similar differences are acquu
observed in equity-financed acquisitions. The two countries also exhibit use di
significant institutional differences in regulations affecting corporate
financing activities and taxation, regulations that should affect the pre-
ferred means of payment for acquisitions. For example, the U.S. gov-
ernment has demonstrated a much more liberal attitude toward share
repurchases than has the U.K. government over most of the period 0cas
under study here. As a consequence, at least one set of theories would 8 2 2 anticipate different financing patterns between the two countries.
Following a preview of this paper's results in the next section, 1.1
section 8.3 surveys theories of acquisition financing, and section 8.4 finan
summarizes existing empirical studies. The data set and methodology befor
are described in section 8.5. Spanning the period 1955—85, the data offen
include over 2,500 acquisitions in the United Kingdom and the United
States, forming probably one of the largest corporate data sets em- •2.I
ployed in an analysis of acquisitions. nifica
Section 8.6 examines the forms of financing that were used in ac- sition
quisitions over the 30 years of the study. These financing patterns are 3.
related to salient tax and institutional considerations. Section 8.7 de- playe
scribes share price responses around the announcement date of the Of'ai
acquisition and also reports the wealth gains to bidders and targets in share
cash- and equity-financed acquisitions. Previous studies have recorded 4.
performance variations by class of acquisition. For example, bid pre- share
mia have been observed to be greater in tender offers than in mergers. acqui
Here we assess whether these differences can be attributed to the
forms of financing or to the type of acquisition. Section 8.8 reports 8.2.3
postmerger performance for up to two years after the acquisition. 1.
Finally, section 8.9 summarizes the results and discusses how the finali:
limitations of the methodology employed here can be avoided in a in eit
broader cross-sectional study. 2.'
in th4
8.2 A Preview of the Results 8.2.4
In view of the length of this paper, we provide a preview of the 1.
results to help focus our description of the theory and the hypotheses. tions223 Means of Payment in Takeovers
Ltiofl 8.2.1Means of Payment
•ned 1. Just over half of the sample of U.K. acquisitions were either "all
not equity" or "all cash" bids, with an approximately equal distribution
the between the two. Almost two-thirds of the U.S. acquisitions were either
ues all equity or all cash.
2. The higher proportion of "mixed bids" in the United Kingdom is
the in part accounted for by the provision of cash alternatives to equity
)W5 offers.Those cash alternatives are frequently underwritten.
un- 3. In the latter half of the 1960s approximately half of the U.S.
ues acquisitions were effected by an offer of convertibles, although their
are use dropped significantly by the 1970s.
ibit 4. Cash acquisitions in the United States increased from a negligible
ate proportion of all acquisitions during the 1950s to just under 60 percent
re- by number during the 1980s.
0V 5. There has not been a similar discernible upward trend in the use
are of cash in the United Kingdom.
iod
uld 8.2.2Returns around the Announcement of a Merger
on 1. Returns to bidder shareholders were similar in cash- and equity-
8.4 financed acquisitions in the United Kingdom during the six months
before (but not including) the announcement month. U.S. acquirers
ata offering equity slightly outperformed those offering cash in the prebid
ted period.
m- 2. Bid premia to target shareholders in cash acquisitions were sig-
nificantly in excess of those accruing to shareholders in equity acqui-
ac- sitions in both countries.
'ire 3. In the United Kingdom neither cash nor equity acquisitions dis-
played significant abnormal returns to bidder shareholders in the month
he of an acquisition.Gains toacquisitions thus accruetotarget
in shareholders.
ed 4. In the United States there are significant positive gains to bidder




fl. 1. Postmerger returns (measured two years after the merger was
he finalized) were not significantly different from zero in cash acquisitions
a in either country.
2. There is evidence that U.S. shareholders sustained abnormal losses
in the two years after an equity acquisition.
8.2.4Results Relating to Capital Gains Tax Theories
1. The larger gains accruing to target shareholders in cash acquisi-
S. tions than in equity acquisitions may be consistent with the theory thatI
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target shareholders have to be compensated for the capital gains taxes
levied on cash but not on equity acquisitions.
2. Nevertheless, differences in bid premia in cash- and equity-
financed acquisitions in the United Kingdom existed before 1965, when
a capital gains tax was introduced. Bid premia can therefore at best
only be partly explained by capital gains tax.
3. Furthermore, this proposition is not supported by other evidence
showing the means of payment to be unresponsive to appreciable changes
in capital gains tax rates in the United Kingdom.
225
in eve
8.2.5Results Relating to "Trapped Equity" Theories and U
I. Theories that treat acquisitions as a tax-efficient method of making
distributions to shareholders predict a reduction in cash acquisitions
when the costs of alternative forms of distributions (such as dividends)
fall (King 1986). The proportion of acquisitions financed with cash was
not affected by the 1973 introduction of the imputation tax system in
the United Kingdom, which reduced the costs of dividend payments.
2. Despite the fact that repurchases of shares were not feasible in
the United Kingdom over the period of the study, the proportion of
acquisitions financed with cash in that country was less than in the
United States in recent years. Since repurchases are as tax efficient as
cash acquisitions, trapped equity theories would predict a greater use
of cash in the United Kingdom. The availability of a stepped-up basis
on depreciable assets may have provided a tax incentive for the higher
use of cash in the United States.
8.2.6Results Relating to Information and Agency Theories
1. The proposition that cash is used in high-value acquisitions to
preempt competing bids (Fishman 1986) is consistent with the finding
of larger bid premia paid in cash than in equity acquisitions.
2. Nonetheless, the evidence that cash was more commonly em-
ployed in contested bids is not consistent with the view that cash is
preemptive.
3. The abnormal losses incurred by shareholders of bidding com-
panies (in the United States, at least) upon announcements of equity
acquisitions, and the postmerger abnormal losses associated with eq-
uity acquisitions, are consistent with the proposition that asymmetries
in information encourage the issue of overvalued equity by acquirers.
8.2.7Explaining Previous Results
I. A significant proportion of the difference in bid premia between
tender and non-tender offers is attributable to the greater use of cash
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taxes 2. Negative postmerger performance by thefirm,which hasbeen
observedin some previous studies, appears to be closely associated
with the use of equity.
when
Lt best 8.2.8International Comparisons
I. In the U.S., acquirers using equity incur abnormal losses on the
bid announcement, whereas those using cash make abnormal gains. In
/
langes the U.K., in contrast, no significant gains or losses are incurred by
bidders using cash or equity. These results are similar to those found
in event studies of new (seasoned) equity issues in the United Kingdom
and United States, respectively.
aking 2. Underwriters in the United Kingdom played a much more im-
itions portant role in acquisition finance than did their counterparts in the
lends) United States. Not only did they play a role in financing acquisitions
h was where the bidder lacked cash, but also where the bidder required ex-
em in ternal validation of the valuation of its offer.
ieats.
ble in 8.3Theories of Means of Payment in Acquisitions
ion of In complete markets with symmetric information and in the absence
in te of taxes, shareholders should be indifferent to the means of payment
ent as used in acquisitions: share price responses should reflect only the
..r use changes in fundamental values induced by the merger. But the tax
system and specific features of the capital market do encourage the ig er use of particular forms of finance. This section surveys theories of the
choice of acquisition financing. We first discuss the tax-based models
and then agency and information theories.
nsto 8.3.1The Influence of Taxation on the Medium of Exchange
nding The choice of a means of exchange affects the tax liabilities of the
acquired firm's shareholders. In an equity acquisition the investor's
em- acceptance of the stock of the acquiring company avoids the realization
sh 15 of any capital gain and does not therefore impose an immediate capital
gains tax liability on the investor. These taxes are deferred until the
corn- investor sells the shares. In a cash purchase the investor's gain must
quity be realized immediately for tax purposes, thus creating a tax liability
h eq- at the capital gains tax rate. In the absence of other considerations,
we would not expect to observe cash acquisitions. Nonetheless, the
irers. payment of capital gains taxes depends on the tax status of the investor,
and the full capital gains tax rate may be mitigated by exemptions and
allowances. The rate will be smallest for targets with "marginal" inves-
veen tors that are tax exempt or have unused allowances. For these investors
cash persona! tax considerations will bear little relation to the desired means
of payment.226JulianR. Franks,Robert S. Harris, and Colin Mayer 227
Where a capital gains tax liability is created, additional considera-
tions must justify the use of cash. For example, under the U.S. tax acquis
code a cash acquisition permits the acquiring company to "write up" acquis
certain assets of the acquired firm to their fair market value. This write- stockh
up produces higher tax deductible depreciation allowances not available
in all equity bids. This corporate tax advantage of cash bids is somewhat
tempered by the recapture taxes due on the written-up values of tan- ferenc
gible assets when the acquisition is consolidated by the acquirer. Thus, in the
the U.S. code can provide an incentive for cash bids in cases in which Moi
market values exceed book values of the acquired firms' assets. Such with a
a "stepped up" basis is not available in the United Kingdom. For target ment,
shareholders to be indifferent to the use of cash and nontaxable forms i throul
of payment, cash purchases must create pretax gains, as measured by (I) bid premia, that are larger than those associated with equity purchases..
The net gain to the bidder is then the value of the "write up," less the if we
increment to the bid premium. Thus: unit 0
costs)
HYPOTHESIS 1. Bid premia are higher in cash-financed than in equity- implic
financed acquisitions. Other things equal, the use of cash in acqui- previ
sitions is inversely related to the capital gains tax rate of the acquired q*
firms' shareholders and directly related to the potential for writing and p
up depreciable assets. cost
The above-mentioned disincentives to use cash in acquisitions may (2)
be offset by considerations of the tax position of the acquiring firm's
b shareholders. Cash acquisitions may afford tax savings because divi-
USi
dend payments are taxed at shareholders' personal income tax rates. (3)
Thus, cash acquisitions may be more tax efficient than dividend pay-
If ments if capital gains taxes are smaller than personal income taxes on
h dividend income. According to the models of Auerbach (1979) and King
In
(1977), under conditions in which a firm's marginal valuation ratio rIg
(referred to below as q) is less than unity but more than the value of esci
a unit dividend distribution to shareholders, there are disincentives to incre
paying cash dividends. Distributions to shareholders could be achieved quist
at a lower tax cost by share repurchases or voluntary liquidation (see
Edwards and Keen 1985). In the United Kingdom share repurchases '
have been permitted only since 1985. In the United States share re- (4)
purchases were permitted for the period of our study and have now
Th become widespread (see Shoven and Simon 1987). It is possible, how-
d ever, that even in the United States restrictions on the tax status of un
repurchases may favor alternative routes of distributing cash—.through,
for example, acquisitions. Thus:
ta
HYPOTHESIS 2. The incentives to use cash in acquisitions are greater impU
in circumstances where share repurchases are prohibited or costly, to ac227 Means of Payment in Takeovers
idera- King (1986) has further specified the tax incentive to make cash
.tax acquisitions. He argued that, in the absence of share repurchases, cash
up" acquisitions are a tax-efficient way of distributing trapped equity to
write- stockholders. Companies make cash acquisitions because the cost of
jiable purchasing assets traded in the corporate sector is less than that of
purchasing (equivalent) assets in the unincorporated sector. The dif-
f tan- ference in cost is accounted for by the tax wedge between income taxed
rhus, in the corporate and personal sectors.
which More formally, let Ca and C1 be the costs of adjustment associated
Such with a unit purchase of capital through acquisition and capital invest-
:arget ment, respectively. Equality at the margin of the cost of purchases
orms through cash acquisition and investment requires that:
(1)
ases.
s the if we assume that financial markets place a value of q on an additional
unit of capital (which costs $1 to purchase in the absence of adjustment
costs) once it is in the corporate sector. King's model focuses on the
implicationsof having $1 in the corporate sector (generated from, say,
cqUi- previouslyprofitable investments) that is worth q' in financial markets;
wred q'may be less than unity because of the double layers of corporate
iting and personal taxes. As these dollars are used to purchase capital (at a
cost of I + C), equality at the margin requires that
may (2) qq' (I + C1).
rms . .
divi- Substituting (2) into (I) and simplifying yields
ates. (3) =q((1/q')—1).
If profits in the corporate sector are taxed more heavily than those
Kin in the personal sector, q is less than unity, and the expression on the
righthand side of equation (3) is increasing in q. Thus, under reasonable
ie of descriptions of the cost of adjustment function, Ce,, acquisitions are
to increasing in q. For example, letting A represent dollars spent on ac-
:ved quisitions and K the capital stock, the quadratic costs of adjustment
are described as Ca =13o+(A/qK). Substituting this into equation
ases (3) yields
re- (4) A/K =— + —q')/q']
The driving force behind King's description of acquisitions is the
undervaluation at the margin of $1 in the corporate sector—the so-called
ugh trapped equity model of acquisitions. For example, if the corporate tax
rate is z and the personal tax rate is m, then under a classical system
of taxation, q' =(1—t),and under an imputation system with an
ater imputation rate of m, q' =(I—t)/(I—m),which creates an incentive
stly. to acquire so long as t> rn.' Thus:228 JulianR. Franks, Robert S. Harris, and Cohn Mayer r
229
HYPOTHESIS3. The tax incentive to make cash acquisitions is in- metnes
creasing in the value of the tax wedge (1 —and the square of tions, a
the marginal valuation of capital ratio, q. discour
give ris
8.3.2Information and Agency Models Hyp0
chap,
If all parties to an acquisition are not equally well informed about (the,
future prospects, the choice of a means of finance may be influenced
by considerations other than taxation. In particular, asymmetries in Char
information encourage the pursuit of opportunistic gains. In acquisi- to rath
tions two types of asymmetries in information might be anticipated: acquir
either the acquirer has superior information about valuations of its revalw
assets, or the acquiree has superior information about its assets. In the to use
former case the acquirer has an incentive to undertake equity acqui- possibi
sitions during periods in which its shares are overvalued—or at least First
not undervalued. In the latter case the acquiree has an incentive to equity
accept offers during periods in which its equity is perceived to be acquir
overvalued. When
Myers and Majluf (1984) have examined the influence of misvalua- luf 198
tions on the incentives for firms to make new equity issues. They argued Sec
that there is a disincentive for firms to use new equity as a means of its tru
funding new investments. If managers have superior information about will
the value of the firm's existing assets and investment opportunities, (Hans
they will want to restrict sales of shares to periods when current and in the
prospective investments are not undervalued by new investors. New when
shareholders in turn appreciate this incentive to sell overvalued equity, Thi
and as a result they downgrade their valuation of firms that make new the hi
equity announcements. Furthermore, since firms have an alternative follov
form of financing available (say, cash or debt) that avoids the adverse value
selection problem, any new issues of equity must be prompted by Cony
overvaluation.2 Riskless securities will be issued in preference to eq- will v
uity, thereby creating the "peeking order" hypothesis of Myers (1984), adver
according to which retentions are used in preference to debt, which is (Fish
in turn issued in preference to equity. Smith (1986) reviewed studies Fis
demonstrating negative average price effects when a new stock issue and h
is announced. costs
In the context of acquisitions the Myers and Majluf model has two target
principal implications. The first is that the use of equity will be dis- tionS
couraged in circumstances in which bidders are better informed about comp
their own asset valuation. The second is that bidders will be discour- Cash
aged from buying shares in targeted companies if the targets are better targel
informed about their own valuations than are bidders. In sum, asym- for229 Means of Payment in Takeovers
isin- metrics in information about the value of targets discourage acquisi-
are of tions, and asymmetries in information about the value of the bidder
discourage the use of equity finance. These information asymmetries
give rise to the following share price response:
HYPOTHESIS 4. The announcement of equity as the medium of ex-
change inan acquisition leads to afall in the share price of the bidder
/about (theissuer), while the use of cash leads to a rise in share price.
enced
jes in Changing one's assumptions about the information structure leads
quisi- to rather different predictions. If information about the quality of the
)ated: acquirer or acquiree becomes evident only after the bid announcement,
of its revaluations will subsequently occur and managers will have incentives
In the to use particular types of finance. The literature discusses three
•icqui- possibilities.
least First, if the acquirer is better informed about the value of its own
ve to equity and misvaluations are revealed only after the acquisition, the
to be acquirer has an incentive to use equity during periods of overvaluation.
When equity is undervalued, acquirers will offer cash (Myers and Maj-
luf 1984).
rgued Second, if the acquiree is better informed about its own value, and
ns of its true valuation is revealed only after the acquisition, equity offers
about will be preferred to cash when equity is believed to be undervalued
ities, (Hansen (1984, 1987)). Acquirees prefer to retain an equity participation
t and in the merged firm in order to capture some of the subsequent gains
New when the undervaluation is revealed.
uity, Third, if premerger appraisals make the acquirer well informed about
new the high value of the acquiree, it will offer cash in the acquisition. This
ative follows from the desire of the acquirer to capture the benefits of high
'erse value acquisitions and to avoid sharing these gains with the acquiree.
d by Conversely, when it is uncertain about acquiree valuations, the acquirer
eq- will wish the retain an equity holding. This diminishes the
984), adverse selection associated with better informed acquirees
ch (Fishman 1986).
'dies Fishman has also argued that cash will be associated with high offers
and high bid premia provided by the acquirer. He assumed some fixed
costs for collecting information about the value of the prospective
two target, which encourage acquirors who establish high-value acquisi-
dis- tions to make preemptive bids.3 These preemptive bids deter other
bout companies from paying for information and initiating competing offers.
our- Cash offers should therefore be associated with high bid premia for the
target, low levels of competition, and positive abnormal performance
ym- for the bidder after the bid announcement.V.—
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In sum, theories of acquisition finance offer some explicit hypotheses targe
about the means of payment, bid premia, and share price movements Abn
after a bid announcement. In the remainder of the paper we examine acqu
how well each of the theories explains the empirical results. betw
feren
8.4Previous Empirical Work C
8.4.1Means of Payment
Two previous studies have investigated the choice of financing method to ci
used in U.S. acquisitions, incorporating, at least to some extent, per- cove
sonal tax considerations. Applying a conditional logit model, Carleton U.S.
et al. (1983) examined the financial accounts of acquired firms to study cash
the probability of three events: being acquired in a cash offer, being pren
acquired in a securities exchange, and not being acquired. In their N
sample of companies from the years 1976—77, they found (p. 825) that Nev
"lower dividend payout ratios and lower market-to-book ratios in- Fren
crease the probability of being acquired in a cash takeover relative to weri
being acquired in an exchange of securities." The authors concluded 49 e
that on the assumption that book values measure the basis on which TI
capitalgains liabilities are calculated, the finding on market-to-book that
ratios is consistent with a personal tax disadvantage to cash offers. equi
They also discussed the possibility that a market-to-book ratio may
proxy for other effects such as inefficient management of the target.
8 5 The authors found no satisfactory explanation for their findings on
dividend payout.
8 5 Niden (1986) has provided an extensive discussion of tax issues in
U.S. takeovers. She examined the choice between taxable (essentially 0
all-cash) and nontaxable (mainly equity) forms of payment based on Stat
an analysis of variables proxying for the tax position of each of the wit!
combining firms. Although her logit models had small explanatory power, Lon
Niden found no relationship the tax paying status of target Jun
shareowners and the form of payment. cort
of t
8.4.2Bid Premia
A recent study by Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1986) focused di- of
rectly on the impact of the form of financing on merger returns. Using forr
a sample of 343 U.S. mergers over the years 1975—83, the authors Fin;
found that equity offers were associated with significantly smaller re- F
turns to both bidders and targets than were cash offers. For targets the
they reported bid premia of 27.5 percent for cash bids and 13.9 percent thrt
for equity bids. For bidders, those using cash earned 0.2 percent and The
those using equity earned —2.4 percent, although for relatively large Stoi231 Meansof Payment in Takeovers
otheses targets the figures were 0.95 percent and —5.39 percent, respectively.
vements Abnormal losses were positively related to the relative size of the
acquisition. The findings suggested that differences in merger returns
between alternative forms of financing can completely explain the dif-
ferences recorded between returns in mergers and those in tender offers.
Controlling for whether a merger was horizontal or conglomerate in
nature, Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1983) found acquiree bid premia of
31.5 percent in 102 cash bids and 16.8 percent in 87 securities offers.
They concluded that higher bid premia are required in cash acquisitions
method to compensate for capital gains tax liabilities. Niden (1986) also un-
it, per- covered higher bid premia to acquirees in taxable acquisitions.Dividing
arleton U.S. acquisitions over the years 1963—77 into 230 taxable (largely all-
study cash) and 318 tax-free (mainly all equity) acquisitions, she reported bid
being premia of 25.4 percent and 11.9 percent, respectively.
n their No similar studies of the United Kingdom have been undertaken.
5) that Nevertheless, Eckbo and Langohr (1986), in a study of bid premia in
in- French takeovers from 1966 to 1980, found that the average offer premia
tive to were significantly higher in the 50 cash offers (53 percent) than in the
:luded 49 exchanges of securities (20 percent).
which The most consistent result to emerge from these previous studies is
-book that bid premia are significantly higher in cash acquisitions than in




tially Our sample contains data from both the United Kingdom and United
d on States, constructed in parallel fashion. For the U.K. data we started
f the with an exhaustive set of almost I ,900 acquisitions as recorded in the
)Wer, London Share Price Database (LSPD) for the period January 1955 to
arget June 1985 (see Franks and Harris 1986a). The LSPD includes all U.K.
companies quoted in London since 1975 and approximately two-thirds
of the companies quoted before 1975, with a bias in favor of larger
companies. For each acquisition we then gathered data on the means
d di- of payment from the Stock Exchange Year Book, which reports in-
Jsing formation from offer documents only where the acquirer is quoted.
hors Financing data existed for 954 of the acquisitions.
r re- For the U.S. data we extracted information on all firms, recorded in
the Chicago Research in Security Prices (CRSP) files, that disappeared
cent through acquisition during the period January 1955 to December 1984.
and The CRSP files cover all companies on the New York and American
arge Stock Exchanges since 1962 and all firms on the NYSE since 1926. We232JulianR. Franks, Robed S. Hams, and Cohn Mayer
obtained data on means of payment from The Capital Changes Re-
porter. Our final U.S. sample contains 1,555 acquired firms with fi-
nancing data, and 850 bidders. Using the Wall Street Journal Index,
we classified takeovers as tenders or mergers based on when control
first passed to the bidder. Thus, if the bidder purchased 60 percent of
the target's shares via tender and the remaining shares via merger, the
bid would be classified as a tender.
In cases where several acquisitions were made by the same bidder,
the bidder was counted separately by each acquisition made.
8.5.2Merger Dates
For each U.K. acquisition we have up to four key dates. The first
approach date is the date when the Stock Exchange is first informed
that merger talks are under way. The first bid date gives the date of
the first formal merger offer. This is followed by an unconditional date
when a sufficient proportion of shares has been pledged to the acquiring
company to guarantee legal control. Finally, the LSPD date shows the
last date for which stock returns data are available for the target, usually
the delisting date. The first three dates are taken from records of the
EXTEL Company, which collects and records such data. Not all ac-
quisitions had four distinct dates. For example, the first bid date may
not be preceded by a formal announcement of talks.
For each U.S. acquisition we obtained three key dates. The first
mention of an acquisition in The Wall Street Journal Index was taken
to be the announcement date. This date is often the actual bid date but
may also be a positive indication of a forthcoming bid. We record dates
of bid revisions, as well as the final bid date, the date of the bid that
was ultimately successful. Finally, we record the delisting date for the
acquiree's stock.
8.5.3Share Price Data
Monthly rates of return are taken from the LSPD and CRSP files.
In the United Kingdom these are calculated using jobbers' (market
makers') price quotes (the average of the bid and the asking price) at
the end of the final trading day of the month. Although traded prices
are available, the order of prices during a day is not, thereby prohibiting
identification of end-of-day traded prices. Jobbers' quotes may not be
available on the last day of the month, either because the company's
stock has been suspended or because the shares were not traded that
day. If there were no jobbers' quotes on the last day of the month, we
calculated the returns using a randomly selected traded price on the
day of the month when the stock was last traded. The results were not
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s Re- 8.5.4Abnormal Returns and Tests
th To assess the effects of mergers on share prices, we use variations
idex, ofevent study methodology. Specifically, for any companyj we define
ntroi an abnormal return as
nt of
r, the (5) ar3,= r3,—C31,
f where rft is the continuously compounded realized return (log form) in
dder, month t (dividends plus capital gains), andis a control return that
estimates shareholder returns in the absence of a merger. Time, t, is
• defined relative to an event date. For the U.K. mergers we use the first
available of either the first approach, first bid, unconditional or LSPD
• dates; for the U.S. mergers we use the announcement date. Since
f specification of the control returns is controversial, we define control
C 0 returnin three alternative ways as described later in this section.
cite Company abnormal returns are then aggregated to form a portfolio
abnormal monthly return (ARt) defined as
(6) AR, =
whereN is the number of companies in a particular portfolio, for ex-
ample, the portfolio of acquirees. The statistical significance of AR, is
first assessed with the statistic TAR, =AR,/a,where a is the standard
Lken deviation of the AR, terms (assumed to be normally distributed) for a
but time period assumed to be unaffected by the merger. In the results
ates reported here a is calculated for the period t= —71to t= —12. Given
that these procedures, TAR, is distributed according to student's t- (distri-
the bution with 59 degrees of freedom. This procedure provides a crude
adjustment for cross-sectional dependence, as discussed by Brown and.
Warner (1980). Alternatively, the statistical significance of AR, is tested
nonparametricaily using the percentage of the ar3, terms that are pos-
ies. itive. This is accomplished by comparing the positive percentage to a
binomial distribution when the probability of a positive return is 0.50.
)at To measure returns over a number of months, we calculate a cu-
•ces mulative abnormal return, CAR,, as
ting
t be (7) cAR, = AR1,
ly's
that whereis the month at which the cumulation begins. Under the as-
we sumption that the AR, estimates are independent, the significance of
the CAR, can be assessed_using the statistic TCAR, =CARI/aCAR where
not aCARaVt — tb+ I and a is estimated as described above. TCAR,
the is approximately a standard normal variate under the null hypothesis
that CAR, has a zero mean.234JulianR. Franks, Robert S. Harris, and Cohn Mayer 235
AlthoughCAR is frequently used for assessing multiperiod returns, 13 for the
it can be unsatisfactory when companies disappear from the analysis Dimson'
because of nontrading or because companies are delisted or suspended model v
close to the bid date. As an alternative to CAR, we construct company- on the
specific multiperiod returns. These company "bid premia," bps,, are where 13
aggregated into portfolio bid premia, BP,, defined as
IN N Treasur
(8) B!', =— — United
where the cumulation process begins at time tbandincludes those 8.6Fo
monthly abnormal returns which are observed up to and including
month t. For example, if in month + I two companies obtain an average We flu
residual of 10 percent and in month + 2 only one survives (or is traded) of U.S.
and obtains a residual of 5 percent, the CAR for the two months ac- trends C
cording to equation (7) is 15 percent, and 12.5 percent according to of
equation (8). We assess the statistical significance of BP using the Iflsectui
statistic TBP =BP/a8p,where TBP = and Tis the average (across 8 6 1 1 companies) number of months for which return data are available to
form B!'. TBP is the analogue of TCAR, shown above. Table
The calculations of TBP and TCAR both use a specified as the stan- two mo
dard deviation of abnormal returns for some time period removed from these
the merger. It can be argued that there are transitory (or permanent) U:K.
risk shifts associated with mergers that might not be captured by our
calculation of a. As an alternative procedure, we calculated statistics binatiG
based on the cross-sectional standard error of company-specific bid cash or
premia This "cross-sectional" t is calculated as BP/SE, where of the
SE =SD/\/N,and SD is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the provid
bid premia for the N companies averaged to get BP. In general, the the latt
results using these cross-sectional t-statistics are quite comparable to bidder,
those using TBP and TCAR discussed above, of the
by the
8.5.5Control Returns Thes
Brown and Warner's (1980, 1985) simulation results on both monthly alent si
and daily data suggest that relatively straightforward procedures are liable t
as powerful as more elaborate tests in detecting abnormal returns (see with al
also Brown and Weinstein 1985). To see whether the specification of paper ii
controlreturns affects our results, we use three alternate models to efficien
determine c1, using the following equation: a sourc
the ma
cfl =+ partiall
In the first model, the market model, values for a and 13areestimated any sh
by regressing rj,onrm,forthe 60-month period beginning at t= —71. elects t
Because of the documented effects of infrequent trading in the United tant wi
Kingdom on estimated parameters (Dimson and Marsh (1983)), a and uncerV
Lr
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p forthe United Kingdom companies are adjusted for thin trading using
Dimson's (1979) method for the same 60-month penod.4 In the second
ended model we set a =0and 13 =Ifor all firms. The third model is based
pany- on the capital asset pricing model and sets Cfl= rf, + — rft),
are where 13 is from the market model and rf,isthe yield on a government
obligation. For the United Kingdom we use the yield on three-month
Treasury obligations converted to a one-month yield basis. For the
United States we use yields on one month Treasury bills.
those 8.6Forms of Financing in U.K. and U.S. Acquisitions
We first describe the different forms of financing used in our samples
aded) of U.S. and U.K. acquisitions, the importance of each form, and the
s ac- trends over the 30-year period. We then assess whether these patterns
to of financing are consistent with the predictions of the theories reviewed
; the in section 8.3.
8.6.1Means of Payment e 0
Table8.1 shows that all-cash offers and all-equity offers were the
two most widely used means of payment in both countries. Together
rrom these two types of offers constituted almost one-half of the successful
ient) U.K. takeovers and over two-thirds of the U.S. offers. In the United
our Kingdom an additional one in five acquisitions involved either a corn-
tics bination of cash and equity or the seller's option to receive either all
bid cash or all equity. In the "all cash or all equity" case, each shareholder
of the target may elect to receive all cash or all equity. The bidder will
the provide the cash from its own resources or through an underwriter. In
the the latter case, shareholders of the target tender their shares to the
to bidder, which then issues new shares to the underwriter (on the basis
of the bid terms); the underwriter then remits the amount prescribed
by the cash alternative to the tendering stockholders.
These "all cash or all equity" offers have become increasingly prey-
hly alent since 1979. One reason is that they provide shareholders who are
are liable to pay capital gains taxes on realized gains (if they receive cash)
see with an equity alternative, and others, who do not want the bidder's
of paper in their portfolio, with cash. The offer is tax and transaction cost
to efficient. The role of the underwriter may be twofold: It simply provides
a source of cash for a cash-hungry bidder; and it provides a signal to
the market of the value of the bidder's equity from an informed (or
partially informed) trader. This informed trader must agree to purchase
ed any shares at a predetermined price whenever a target shareholder
1. elects to take the cash alternative. This role may be especially impor-
tant where the acquisition is relatively large and where there is great
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Table 8.1 Mediumsof Exchange inU.K.
Proportions,1955—85
and U.S. Acquisitions, in
U.K. U.S.
A. Method of Payment
All cash .253 .306
Cash or debt .016 .003
All debt .014 .014
All cash or (cash plus equity) .035 .001
Cash plus equity .101 .009
Cash or equity" .100 .013
Convertibles — .118
Equity plus debt .048 .003
Equity plus convertibles — .073
All equity .246 .371
Other" .189 .090
Total 1.00 1.00
B. Use ofCash, Equity and
At least some equity' .660 .601
At least some cash or some debt .633 .404
At least some cash .538 .356
"The "or" denotes that the seller has the option to receive either form of payment. The
option to receive "cash or equity" has become increasingly popular since 1978. Before
then the ratio of "all equity" to "all cash or all equity" was 3.27, but during 1978—84
it fell to 1.17. The "other" category includes various mixtures of cash, equity, and debt,
as well as other types of payment (such as preference stock). in the U.K. sample the
largest single category involves mixtures subsequent to recapitalizations (.083).
5Categones are not mutually exclusive so that percentages sum to more than 100. The
data include mixture offers after recapitalizations.
'For purposes of this tabulation, securities convertible into common equity are treated
as equity.
Unlikein the United Kingdom, the cash alternative and Cash-equity
combinations have not been significant in the United States. All debt
offers were rare in both countries, and combination offers involving
debt are infrequent, though more common in the United Kingdom. A
striking contrast between the two countries is in the use of convertibles
securities. In the United States 11.8 percent of takeovers involved full
payment with convertibles (such as convertible preferred stock), and
art additional 7.3 percent were combinations of equity and convertibles.
In the United Kingdom the use of convertibles was negligible.
Panel B shows that a larger proportion of U.K. takeovers than U.S.
takeovers involved at least some cash or some debt. In addition, a
slightly larger proportion of U.K. offers involved at least some equity.
These figures reflect the greater use of combination offers in the United
Kingdom.
Table 8.2 divides the entire 30-year period into five-year blocks, and
figure 8.1 displays the results by year. In the United States all-cash—I
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Table 8.2 Time-Series of the Forms of Payment in


























.354 .354 69 .000
.292 .404 121 .008
.186 .244 386 .013
.230 .237 177 .192
.336 .231 373 .491
.205 .190 429 .585
.094 .170— —

















Note: Entries are proportions of the sample (N) with a type of offer.
"Theseareoffers that' are equity plus securities convertible into equity or whichare
solely convertible.
hAverages are weighted by the number of mergers.
takeoverswere not observed in our sample until 1965, but after that
they became increasingly important.5 At the same time, all-equity offers
fell from three-quarters of U.S. takeovers in the late 1950s to less than
one-quarter in the 1980s. This striking increase in the use of cash
occurred over a period in which the Williams Act (1968) and its ex-
tension (1970) imposed more stringent requirements on cash offers. In
contrast, in the United Kingdom financing proportions fluctuated con-
siderably over the 30 years of the study.
Table 8.2 also demonstrates that the heavy use of convertibles in the
United States was largely a phenomenon of the 1960s. Over the years
1965—69 fully one-half of United States bids involved convertible se-
curities. By the 1980s the proportion had fallen to only 5.4 percent.
The downturn in takeover financing with convertibles was probably
due to changes in U.S. tax law and accounting standards. Enactment
of Section 279 of the tax code in 1969 eliminated the tax deductibility
of interest payments on convertible debt expressly issued for acqui-
sitions. In addition, Accounting Principles Board Opinion 15, issued
in 1969, required the reporting of earnings per share on a fully diluted
basis. This change may have reduced the incentive to issue convertibles
because of the impact of earnings dilution on contractual arrangements,
for example, in bond covenants. Also, managers and investment bank-
ers may have been apprehensive about investor reaction to even only
cosmetic reductions in earnings per share.
The proportions in both tables 8.1 and 8.2 were calculated on an
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Fig.8.1 Time-series of acquisition payment type
STable 8.3 Forms of Payme
Weighted Basis
at in UK andUS Takeovers, on aValue-
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Note: Entries area proportion of the total. Weights are based on market value of the
shares of the acquired company.
andall-equity offers based on the market value of the acquisitions. In
the United States the proportion of bids that were all cash on a value-
weighted basis was almost identical to the equally weighted proportion
for the period 1955 to 1974. After 1974 cash offers constituted a smaller
proportion on a value-weighted basis than on an equally weighted basis,
suggesting that cash offers were used more frequently in smaller ac-
quisitions. For all equity offers the equally weighted and value-weighted
results are very close, except for during the years 1980—84.
In the United Kingdom the proportion of all cash offers on a value-
weighted basis was appreciably lower than that on an equally weighted
over the years 1955—69. The converse was true for the years 1970—
84. Over the entire 30-year period the proportion of bids that were all
cash was 0.25 on both an equally weighted basis and a value-weighted
basis. For the all-equity figures there was no consistent relationship
between the value and equal weightings. In aggregate the all-equity
proportion on a value-weighted basis was 0.20, whereas it was 0.25 on
an equally weighted basis.
8.6.2Theoretical Predictions and the Evidence
The data shown in tables 8.1 through 8.3 provide some support for
the prediction of hypothesis I that the use of cash in acquisitions should
be inversely related to the capital gains tax rate. The introduction of
capital gains taxes in the United Kingdom in 1965 coincided with a
decline in the proportion of cash-financed acquisitions from an average
of 29.2 percent in 1960—64 to 18.6 percent in 1965—69. This decrease
was short-lived, however, and by 1975—79 the proportion had returned
to 33.6 percent.
Hypothesis 2—the proposition that cash acquisitions are most prev-
alent in an environment, such as the United Kingdom, where share
a
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q
repurchases are prohibited—is contradicted by the finding that the pro-
portion of all-cash bids was greater in the United States than in the
United Kingdom. But in large part cash acquisitions in the United
States began only in the l970s. Their marked growth may reflect more
widespread election of stepped-up basis. Rising inflation in the 1970s
increased the benefits of raising the basis for determining depreciation
allowances from historic to current prices. Since the stepped-up basis
was not available in the United Kingdom, an equivalent trend did not
occur there.
The U.K. financing proportions reported here are most informative
about the trapped equity hypotheses. Since the trapped equity model
is a description of the incentives to make cash distributions through
acquisitions, it is worth recalling that a high proportion of acquisitions
use "all equity"—in fact, the proportion is as large as that of "all
cash". The theory cannot explain the all-equity class of acquisitions.
More strikingly, the cycles of merger activity that have been widely
observed, and which are an important component of the empirical
relationship that King (1986) estimated between the value of acquisi-
tions and stock market prices, do not appear to coincide with peaks in
cash-financed acquisitions. According to figure 8.1 the particularly pro-
nounced U.K. merger booms of 1968 and 1972 did not coincide with
large upswings in the proportion of cash-financed acquisitions.
Still more troublesome for the trapped equity hypothesis is the poor
association between the tax disincentive for dividend distributions and
the level of acquisitions using cash. Recall from hypothesis 3 that the
incentive for cash acquisitions is increasing in the tax wedge. Over the
period under study a number of important tax changes in the United
Kingdom should have affected this wedge. Most obviously, the intro-
duction of the corporation tax in 1965 was associated with an increase
in the tax price of retaining assets in the corporate sector. The incentive
to distribute cash thus rose appreciably in 1965. But figure 8.1 shows
that this coincided with a period during which the proportion of cash-
financed acquisitions declined. Moreover, the introduction of the im-
putation tax in the United Kingdom in 1973 should have, in theory,
lessened the tax price of retaining assets in the corporate sector. Im-
putation is a tax credit attributed to shareholders for the payment of
corporation tax on the profits underlying a distribution. In 1973, 35
percent of the 52 percent corporation tax was imputed to investors'
personal income tax. The corporate tax wedge was therefore only 17
percent, 23 percentage points lower than it was before 1973. Figure
8.1 records, however, that the introduction of imputation was associ-
ated with a period in which the proportion of cash acquisitions sharply
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pro- To summarize, the financing proportions provide little support for
n the the trapped equity model but offer some tentative support for an in-
nited fluence from capital gains tax. The appreciable rise in cash-financed
more acquisitions in the United States over the period studied can be attrib-
•1970s uted, at least in part, to tax benefits from stepped-up basis.
ation
basis
I not 8.7Wealth Effects for Bidder and Target around the Announcement
Date
itive
odel In this section we examine bid premia associated with different means
-
)ugh of payment. We discuss, in turn, bid premia around the announcement
ions date in all-cash and all-equity offers; share price changes before the
•"all announcement; results for "mixed bids"; the effects of other charac-
teristics of takeover, namely, whether the bids are revised or contested
dely and whether they are tender offers; and finally a cross-sectional regres-
rical sion controlling for these bid characteristics.
8.7.1Bid Premia in All-Cash and All-Equity Offers
pro- Table 8.4 presents data on bid premia for all-cash and all-equity offers
with in both countries. Since the results are essentially the same using all
three models of control returns, we report only those for the market
oor model. Panel B shows that U.S. acquirers were more than seven times
and larger than targets in all-cash offers and almost nine times larger in all-
the equity offers. U.K. acquirers were more than twelve times larger than
the targets in all-cash offers and more than six times larger in all-equity
ited offers.
ase Target Shareholders
tive Panel A in table 8.4 shows that in both countries the bid premia for
)WS target shareholders were markedly higher in all-cash offers than in all-
sh- equity offers. The month 0 results for the United Kingdom, for ex-
im- ample, indicate targets with all-cash offers earned a 30.2 percent bid
ry, premium, which was significantly higher than the 15.1 percent premium
Im- in all-equity offers. The t-statistic7 comparing the two figures is 9.49.
of The differences in the United States are even more dramatic, with the
35 month 0 premium of 11.1 percent in all-equity offers being less than
half the all-cash figure of 25.4 percent. We thus find strong evidence
17 that target shareholders receive larger wealth gains in all-cash takeovers
than those involving all equity. This observation is consistent with
pci- hypothesis I, the capital gain tax thesis that higher bid premia are
ply required in cash offers to compensate for the capital gains tax liability;
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Table 8.4 Bid Premia and Market Capitalization in All-Cash and
All-EquityOffers
A. Bid Premia"
Month 0 Months —4 to+ I



































Note: Entriesarebid premia; f-statistics in parentheses.
Cross-sectional t-values for bidder wealth gains are:
Month 0
U.S. U.K.
Months —4to + I
U.K. U.S.
All cash ..95 2.99 3.05 2.05
All equity —1.27 —2.14 .97 .67
where the f-value is calculated as BPISE and where SE = SD/V7N and SD is the cross-
sectional standard deviation.
"Bid premia are calculated using the market model. In the United Kingdom month 0 is
the earliest available of the first approach, first bid, unconditional, or LSPD date. In the
United States month 0 is the announcement date as defined in the text.
bFor U.S. acquirers with all-equity offers, where the bid premia are —0.009 for month
0, only 45.7 percent of the 443 acquisitions were positive. The results using a model
with n0 and= I were virtually identical.
CThe market value of equity prior to takeover.243 Meansof Payment in Takeovers
signals associated with equity offers; and with the Fishman argument
that cash offers coincide with high-value acquisitions.
A comparison of the results for the two countries over the six-month
— periodsuggests all-cash bids coincided with slightly higher bid premia
in the United States than in the United Kingdom (.363 versus .305),
and the differences were statistically significant at better than the .10
level (t =1.92).Comparing the month 0 and month —4 to +Iresults,
we find a greater proportion of the U.S. bid premia in all-cash offers
.363 appear to have come prior to month 0. Turning to the all-equity bids,
.67) we find the U.K. bid premia were somewhat higher than the U.S.
.156 premia (.182 versus .156), though not statistically so when measured
.86) over the six-month period (t =0.85).
.026 BidderShareholders
.89)
Shareholders in the U.K. acquirers earned negligible returns in the
:61) bid month for both all-cash and all-equity offers. Over the six-month
period, however, small (statistically significant) gains accrued for the
— all-cashoffers. Whether this gain was a result of the bid or of the
bidder's timing the offer to correspond to favorable developments in
its stock price is uncertain. There is no evidence, however, of significant
uity losses to bidders in U.K. takeovers around the merger announcement
— date.The results for all-equity offers are similar to those found by
34.8 Marsh (1979) for the month following the rights issue announcement
(results showing small abnormal losses at the time of the announcement).
The difference between the performance of all-cash and all-equity
acquisitions in the United States is striking. In all-cash offers the bid-
ders earned significantly positive gains of 2 percent in month 0. In
contrast, in all-equity offers they experienced a significant loss of 0.9
percent. These wealth effects were also significantly different from each
another (: =4.19).8
Taken together, our U.S. results suggest that equity in acquisitions
DSS- conveys bad news, while cash conveys good news. This role for the
medium of exchange is consistent with theoretical predictions (see, for
o is example, Miller and Rock 1985) and with empirical evidence on new
the equity issue announcements. Smith (1986), surveying an extensive lit-
erature on new equity issues, reported a weighted average loss of 1.6
nth percent. Our results also strongly support Myers and Majluf's predic-
e tions described in hypothesis 4.
Our U.K. results indicate the returns to all-equity bidders in the bid
month were negative but not statistically different from zero. It is
interesting to consider the institutional differences between the two
countries. U.K. underwriters play a much more important role in equity
issues than do their U.S. counterparts. For example, virtually all new
U.K. equity issues have taken the form of rights issues, and virtually
all have been underwritten (see Marsh 1979). According to Heinkel and
I244Julian R. Franks, Robert S. Harris, and Cohn Mayer
Schwartz (1985), the underwriter may be able to avoid some of the
information problems that would otherwise be associated with equity
issues.
Table 8.5 compares U.K. bid premia around the announcement date
of acquisitions for the periods 1955—64 and 1965—85. The significance
of 1965 is that it was in that year that the government instituted a full
capital gains tax. According to hypothesis 1, bid premia in all-cash
acquisitions should have differed from those in all-equity acquisitions
only in the years after the tax was introduced. The table indicates that
although the difference was larger in the later period, bid premia were
significantly higher in all-cash offers than in all-equity offers (t =2.26
in the announcement month) in the earlier period as well. Between
1962 and 1965 there was a short-term capital gains tax on holdings of
less than one year. The difference between cash and equity bid premia
persists prior to 1962, though the sample is too small to provide mean-
ingful tests of significance. The hypothesis that capital gains taxes can
entirely explain differences in the premia of the two kind of offers is
therefore rejected.
8.7.2 A Comparison of the Premerger Performance of Bidders
Using All Cash and Those Using All Equity
Anecdotal evidence from investment bankers in both the United
Kingdom and the United States strongly suggests that they believe the
choice of equity or cash is influenced by perceptions of overvaluation
of the bidder's shares. We can look to the premerger share price per-
formance of bidders for evidence that the premerger valuation of the
acquirer may influence the choice of financing. If overvalued acquirers
Table 8.5 A Comparison of U.K. Bid Premla Before and After 1965
Month 0 Month —4to +I



































Note: Entriesare bid premia; t-statistics in parentheses. Bid premia are calculated using
the market model. Month 0 is the earliest available of the first approach, first bid,
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fthe choose equity, their premerger performance might be expected to be
uit superior to that of acquirers offering cash.
q
Thetable below reports abnormal returns to acquirers for the period
beginning six months before the bid and ending one month before the
bid. The table shows U.S. bidders offering equity had slightly better
performance over the prebid period than did those offering cash. The
prebid performance of the two types of bidders was the reverse in the
United Kingdom. Only very limited support is thereby provided for

























8.7.3Other Types of Offers
In preceding sections the focus was on all-cash and all-equity bids
since they are the primary types of bids made in both countries (see
table 8.1). Table 8.6 presents additional estimates of the wealth effects
of other types of bids.
"Cash or Equity" Offers
Combination offers provide the seller with the opportunity to accept
either cash or stock. This option should reduce any detrimental per-
sonal tax effects associated with an all-cash offer. As shown in table
8.1, these offers have been made frequently in the United Kingdom
but less often in the United States. In the United Kingdom target bid
premia in combination offers were quite similar to those found in all-
cash offers (table 8.4). For example, the 28.4 percent target bid premium
(—4 to + 1) in cash-or-equity offers shown in table 8.6 is very close to
the 30.5 percent premium shown in table 8.4 for all-cash bids. The small
sample size for the U.S. results (N =20)prevents us from making
any definitive statements, although target bid premia appear to be be-
tween those for all-cash and all-equity offers (Table 8.4). In neither
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Table 8.6 The Wealth Effects ofOtherTypes of Offers
Acquirees Acquirers
Type of Offer 0 —4 to + I 0 —4 to + I
1. Cash or equity
U.K.(N =95) .276 .284 .007 .075
(14.79) (6.21) (.49) (2.26)
U.S. (N =20) .180 .266 —.002 —0.010
(8.41) (5.07) (—.09) (—.18)
2. Cashand equity
U.K. (N =100) .238 .271 .003 .054
(18.70) (8.71) (.23) (1.63)
U.S.(N = 15) .099 .212 .057 .015
(3.24) (2.83) (1.88) (.20)
3. Convertibles only
U.S. only(N =184) .117 .176 .018 .031
(21.34) (13.11) (2.80) (1.97)
4. Convertibles and equity
U.S.only (N =115) .101 .143 —.004 .009














Note: Entriesare bid premia; r-statistics in parentheses. Bid premia are calculated using
the market model. The months are defined as in table 8.4.
Time
These results are further evidence that personal tax considerations
do not satisfactorily explain the higher target bid premia in cash offers
since the equity-or-cash option, though tax efficient, led to bid premia
comparable to those in all-cash offers. Thus, the evidence contradicts
hypothesis 1.
"Cash and Equity" Offers
"Cash and equity" bids provide the seller with a combination of
cash and equity and have been used frequently in the United Kingdom.
They appear to offer targets smaller bid premia than do cash-or-equity
or all-cash bids, but higher premia than all-equity bids. Furthermore,
there are no significant wealth effects to bidders in acquisitions in-
volving cash and equity. The pattern in these bids thus appears to be
an average of the results for the all-cash and all-equity offers discussed
earlier.
Convertibles
Convertibles were extensively used in the United States in the l960s
(see table 8.2). As shown in table 8.5, target premia for bids involving
convertibles (either alone or along with equity) coincided very closely
with target prémia for all-equity bids. For example, in the United States
























(table 8.4), 11.7 percent in all-convertible bids, and 10.1 percent in bids
involving both convertibles and equity. A major difference, however,
has to do with the bidders. Whereas, as noted earlier, all-equity bids
in the United States are associated with a negative wealth effect for
acquirers in month 0, all-convertible bids were associated with a sig-
nificant positive gain (1.8 percent) for acquirers in month 0.
8.7.4Bid Premia: Further Analysis
Variations over Time
The differences in bid premia between all-cash and all-equity offers
shown in table 8.4 may be attributable to variations over calendar years
in the performance of acquisitions. This issue is less important in the
U.K. data because all-cash and all-equity offers took place over the

























































































Note: Bid premia (BP)arecalculated using the market model. Month 0 is the announcement
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In panel A of table 8.7 we break our U.S. data into three five-year Pan
periods beginning with 1970, the onset of significant use of alt-cash tendei
offers. As the figures show, the month 0 bid premium estimates for the montt
targets was higher in all-cash offers than in all-equity offers in each of were
the five-year periods. The same patterns hold for the six-month bid
premia (not shown here). In addition, in all-equity offers the wealth
effects for bidders were consistently lower than in all-cash offers, and We
they were negative in both the 1975—79 and the 1980—84 period, though
significantly so only in the latter. Panel A shows that differences be-
tween the wealth effects of all-equity and all-cash bids in the United
1 hi States cannot be attributed to a particular time period,
ae
Tender and Nontender Offers
Earlier research on acquisitions in the United States has indicated
that shareholder wealth effects may be different in tender offers and
mergers. For example, surveying a number of studies, Jensen and Ru-
back (1983) reported acquiree bid premiums of 30 percent in tenders
but only 20 percent in mergers; for acquirers the figures are 4 percent Me
andzero percent, respectively. Panel B of table 8.7 shows the data we A
used to investigate whether the disparity between wealth effects in all-
cash and all-equity can be attributed to a greater use of cash in tenders.
The data indicate that all-cash bids resulted in higher acquiree bid
premia, whether the takeover was a tender or not. Furthermore, panel
B suggests that after having controlled for the medium of exchange, a
difference in bid premia remains between mergers and tenders. For
Tei
example, the 28.3 percent premia in all-cash tenders (in month 0) is
significantly higher than the 24.3 percent figure in all-cash offers that
are not tenders (t =3.60).Panel B also shows that a high proportion
of tenders used cash as the form of financing.
Turning to the results for acquirers in Panel B, we find the an-
nouncement month wealth effect to acquirers making all-equity bids B. a
was negative in both tenders and nontenders, although the sample size M
is small for all-equity tenders. In contrast, the announcement month
wealth effects were positive in all-cash offers whether the bid was a
tender or not. Panel B therefore suggests that the medium of exchange
and the response of acquirers' share prices are related.9
Revised and Unrevised Bids I
In table 8.8 we use the U.S. data to test whether the differences in
all-cash and all-equity bid premiums (partitioned by tender and merger)
are due to the contested nature of the bids. We have evidence from
Franks and Hams (1986a) that bid revisions, even when unaccompan-
ied by contestants, show similar wealth effects to contested bids. As —
aresult we partition offers into those that are unrevised and uncon- No













Panel A shows, for unrevised bids, the target bid premia in all-cash
tenders were slightly higher than those in all-cash mergers (with six-
month bid premia of .384 and .345, respectively). The target bid premia
were significantly higher in all-equity tenders (.258) than in all-equity
mergers (.154). For bids that were revised or contested a similar pattern
emerges, although the difference between tenders and mergers is larger.
We can conclude that all-cash bids still provide much larger premia


























































































































Table 8.8 Bid Premia for Multiple Bids (Revised or Contested) versus Single






on- Note: Entriesare bid premia; 1-statisticsin parentheses.Bid premia are calculated using
the market model. Month 0 is the announcement date as defined in the text.250Julian R. Franks, Robert S. Harris, and CoIm Mayer 251 M
than all-equity bids even after controlling for the form and contested Althougi
nature of the merger and that tenders still provide larger bid premia error for
than mergers. tically si
Table 8.8 also shows that a larger proportion of all-cash than all-
equity bids are revised. If we look at the medium of exchange in the significa
final bid, 28.4 percent of the all-cash bids were contested or revised, controll
whereas only 16.5 percent of the all-equity bids were. From Fishman's coincidi
model we might have expected the converse: His model predicts that percent
contested bids will occur more frequently in low-value equity bids than In fact,
in high-value cash bids. In the latter case, the bidder has placed a high other
value on the target and uses a cash offer to preempt competing bids. United
In fact, competition appears to be more closely associated with cash premia
than with equity offers. It should be noted, however, that a final cash charact
bid may have evolved from an initial equity bid, although Callison's We f
(1987) data show that of 54 all-cash tenders, only one was preceded
by an equity offer. and tiE
Panel B of table 8.8 shows the wealth gains for bidders. Gains to was .1
bidders appear small, and if anything they were larger in all-cash take-
overs than in all-equity bids.
8.81
8.7.5Cross-Sectional Analysis In t
To investigate further the patterns in acquiree bid premia, we esti- (1983)
mate the following cross-sectional regression: negat
natlo
BP =a0+a1D1+ a2D2 + a3D3 + a4D4 + €, settle
where BP is the estimated bid premium in all
=Iif all-cash offer, 0 otherwise
cove D2 =Iiftender offer, 0 otherwise perf
D3 =1if contested bid, 0 otherwise
D4 =Iifrevised bid, 0 otherwise the
arandom error term with zero mean. used
Only all-cash and all-equity offers in the United States are included in
the regression. Furthermore, since the regression results are qualita- 8.8.1
tively similar for all three models of forming control returns, we report Pa
results for the market model only and bid premiums only for the six- diffe
month period around the announcement date. The results are (t-values equi
in parentheses): all-e
BP =.163+ .148D1+ .081D2 + .038D3 + .025D4
(14.94)(6.43) (3.15) (1.66) (.98) The
R2 =.08,F =20.8 mar
L251 Means ofPayment in Takeovers
ted Althoughthe regression has a low R2, in part due to the measurement
mia error for individual company bid premia, theFvalue of 20.8 is statis-
tically significant atbetter thanthe .001 level. The results show that
all- acquiree bidpremiawere larger in contestedorrevised bids and were
the significantly larger in tender offers (coefficient of .081). Evenhaving
ed, controlledfor these effects, however, the all-cash offers appear to
n's coincide with larger acquiree bid premia. The coefficient of .148 (14.8
hat percent) is significantly different from zero at better than the .001 level.
Ian In fact, the medium of exchange has a larger impact than any of the
igh other three effects. The regression results thus suggest that in the
ds. United States the medium of exchange is significantly related to bid
ash premia and that this result is not an artifact of other commonly studied
ash characteristics of the data.
n's We found qualitatively similar regression results for the U.K. data
led after controlling for schemes of arrangement, contested or revised bids,
and time period (a series of dummy variables). The coefficient on D1
to was .104 with a t-statistic of 2.74.
8.8Postmerger Performance
In their review of studies on U.S. acquisitions, Jensen and Ruback
sti- (1983) suggested several possible reasons for the common finding of
negative returns following merger. They concluded (p.22) that "expla-
nation of the post-event negative abnormal returns is currently an un-
settled issue." Table 8.9 reports estimates of postmerger performance
in all-cash and all-equity bids. The results are calculated as the average
cumulative return—BP from equation (8)—over the two-year period
covering months + Ito + 24. For the purposes of measuring postmerger
performance in the United Kingdom, month 0 is the date when the
merger was unconditionally accepted; and for the United States, it is
the date of the final bid. Four methods of forming control returns are
used to test the robustness of the results.
in
ita- 8.8.1Results for the United States
ort Panel A of table 8.9 shows that in the United States there is a marked
IX- differencebetween the postmerger performance of all-cash and all-
les equity bids. Acquirers using all cash did better after merger than did
all-equity bidders, no matter what control return is used. The control
returns (benchmarks) do, however, give rise to quite different figures
for whether postnlerger performance is positive, zero, or negative.
These results highlight the importance of forming an efficient bench-
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Market 1.0 CAPMb Market Modelc






All equity — .184 —.179







Premerger — .003 .99 201
Postmerger — .007 1.04 127
All equity
Premerger .000 .99 442





All cash: N =221 .017 .175
a = .008,=1.07 (.50,53) (6.09,65)
All equity: N =207 —0,094 .042
a = .011.=1.07 (—2.31, 51) (1.23,64)
Note: Entries are bid premia for months + I to +24. For the U.K., results month 0 is
the unconditional date of the merger. For the U.S., results month 0 is the date of the
final bid. The figures in parentheses are 1-statistics and percent positive. For this table,
the 1-statistic is calculated as BP/SE, where SE is the standard error of the mean.
'A market value—weighted average of a and 13 values for the acquiree and acquirer were
also used as parameters in the market model to determine control returns. They showed
very similar results as the unweighted parameters.
hWhenwas estimated as the market value—weighted average of betas for the acquiree
and acquirer, the results were similar. CAPM is the capital asset pricing model.
'The a and 13 values here are calculated over period t+25 months to +60 months
(with a minimum of 24 months of data).
Usingeither a market model with "premerger" estimated parameters
(calculated from six years to one year prior to the bid) or a simple
a =0,13 =1.0model, we find postmerger abnormal returns were
essentially zero in all-cash offers but significantly negative in all-equity
offers. It can be argued, however, that these results reflect the use of
an inappropriate benchmark, since there may be shifts in a firm's ex-
pected returns and risks associated with acquisitions.'° We therefore
estimated a and 13valuesin the market model from a postmerger period253Means of Payment in Takeovers
Idons producingessentiallyzero postmerger returns for all-equity offers and
positive (though not statistically significant) postmerger returns in all-
cash offers. These changes stem from the noticeable reductions in the
erger estimateda values when going from the premerger (six through one
ModeI yearsbefore the bid) to the postmerger (three through five years after
the bid) period. The average postmerger a values are negative for both
all-cash and all-equity offers.
In summary, acquirers that made all-cash bids on average did not
46) sufferpostmerger losses and did better than the bidders that made all-
equity offers. Whether all-equity bidders have postmerger losses de-
pends on the benchmark employed. Compared with premerger perfor-
mance, postmerger returns are negative. But using a benchmark based
on postmerger parameters, we find all-equity acquirers did not expe-
rience abnormal losses in the two years after an acquisition, but they
did have negative a values three to five years after the acquisition.
Given the heavy use of equity in the 1960s, a possible explanation
for these different results for cash and equity offers is that they are
due to the date of the takeover rather than the medium of exchange."
Nonetheless, we found qualitatively similar results (using premerger
parameters) when we divided the post-1970 subsample into five-year
subperiods (post 1970). The results suggest that the medium of ex-
change plays an important role in the postmerger performance of ac-
quiring firms in the United States. We can speculate that this role may
be related to information asymmetries that may motivate equity rather — thancash bids in situations in which the acquirer's equity is overvalued
tho bythe market.
ofthe
table. 8.8.2Results for the United Kingdom
iwere PanelB of table 8.9 shows that postmerger performance results in
howed theUnited Kingdom are highly dependent on the formation of control
returns. As in the United States, all-equity offers had significantly
qu,ree worsepostmerger performance than did all-cash offers. The difference
onths appears to be in the 11 percent to 15 percent range. For example, using
the market model, we find postmerger performance in all-equity offers
was —9.4 percent, which is 11.1 percentage points lower than the 1.7
percent return in all-cash offers.
eters The issue that remains unresolved is whether postmerger perfor-
nple mance in all-equity takeovers was less than zero. The significant neg-
were ative figures resulting from use of the market model were essentially
the result of the very high premerger a values for the acquirers in all-
of equity deals (a0.011 per month, or over 12 percent per year). If
s ex- one applies the capital asset pricing model, the all-equity takeovers
fore appear to have had small positive bidder returns after merger, and in
.all-cash offers the bidders had large positive returns of 17.5 percent.254Julian R. Franks, Robert S. Harris, and Cohn Mayer 255




Inthis paper we have examined the means of payment used in a 2. U
large set of acquisitions in the United Kingdom and the United States orposi
over the years 1955—85. Using data on financing proportions, bid pre-
mia, and postmerger performance we tested the validity of several tax
and information hypotheses in the literature. Our findings show that it same
is difficult to explain many of the results in terms of tax effects. The enable
capital gains tax did not appear to be a primary determinant of financing Grossi
patterns in the United Kingdom during a period in which there were
LI
substantial variations in the tax rate. Our data also show that the "trap-
ped equity" model is inconsistent with financing patterns. We could marke
not reject stepped-up basis as an explanation for the substantial increase cients
in cash-financing proportions in the United States, but our data were
insufficient to provide a convincing test. ini.S
The second set of empirical results we presented concerned wealth
gains around the announcement of mergers. In both countries we ob- financ
served that the bid premia associated with cash bids were much larger both
than those associated with equity bids. This finding is consistent with of exc
Fishman's model that high-valuing bidders make cash offers, and low- financ
valuing bidders make securities offers. After controlling for the form the tii
of finance, we found that much of the difference in bid premia between prima
tenders and mergers disappeared. We also examined whether the effects to acc
of revised or contested bids could explain the higher bid premia ac- The I
cruing to targets in cash offers than to those in equity offers. After
controlling for the form of takeover (tender versus merger) and the grour
contested nature of the bid, we found that cash offers still provided' than I
substantially higher wealth gains to shareholders. Moreover, U.S. bid-
ders that offered all equity suffered significant abnormal losses at the
time of the bid announcement, consistent with the findings on the
wealth effects of seasoned new equity offerings in the United States.
Finally, acquirers that made cash offers had better postmerger perfor-
mance than did those that made all-equity offers. These results support
an overvaluation hypothesis, but they are inconsistent with theories of
efficient capital markets.
Our findings suggest at least two directions for future work. First,
because our results on postmerger performance were sensitive to the
benchmark used, further investigation of this topic is warranted (see 7.
Loderer and Mauer, 1986). Second, after focusing on the means of
payment in takeovers, we believe further insights into the relationships
between financing decisions and acquisition performance could be gained 8.
by incorporating detailed information on the capital structures of the with
merging firms. the2• 255 Means of Payment inTakeovers
suits Notes
1. King's model contains no feature that distinguishes between acquisitions
and new investment.
•in a 2. It is crucial to Myers and Majluf's argument that all projects have a zero
or positive net present value (see idem., 203—4) If projects could have a negative tates net present value, giving up a new project and not issuing equity may not be
pre- good news.
I tax 3. Jensen's ()986) theory of free cash flow could also be used to yield the
tat it same prediction, since increasing the debt ratio of the bidder (via a cash offer)
The enables managers to bond their promise to pay future cash flows. See also
Grossman and Hart (1982).
g 4. For the earliest calendar years of our U.K. analysis, prior data were
were unavailable to calculate a and 13. In these cases companies were assigned a =0,
rap- 13 =1.0.Our adjustment for thin trading regresses company returns on the
ould market return and one-month leads and lags on the market. The three coefii-
ease dents in the multiple regression were summed to obtain 13.
vere 5. Data from W. T. Grimm show the same upward trend in the use of cash
in U.S. acquisitions (and the same decline in the use of stock) beginning around
1970, although the data also reveal that cash was used in the 1960s (the series
begins in 1964). Differences in samples probably account for variations in
financing proportions. Grimm's data include acquisitions and divestitures of
both public and private companies, whereas our data are limited to acquisitions
of exchange-listed companies. The latter are, on average, larger concerns.
6. An examination of Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) data on the
financing of acquisitions reveals similar changes in financing proportions around
the time of the major tax changes discussed here. These data differ from ours
primarily in the population from which their samples are drawn. Our data refer
to acquisitions by companies that were quoted on the London Stock Exchange.
The DTI data are obtained from reports in the British financial press about
mergers and acquisitions. We would argue that there is some merit in using
data on quoted companies in a study of the financing of acquisitions, on the
grounds that the impediments to the choice of financing are less for quoted
































tUp to the third quarter of 1983 only.
7.Significance tests for the difference between two cell means (M1 —M2)
are based on a (-statistic calculated as t= (M1—M2)/SD,where SD =
+andis the standard deviation used to calculate the bid premia
(BP) for the cell mean; in other words,= for cell 1.
8. As confirming statistical tests, we examined the percentage of companies
with positive returns and an alternate method of calculating a t-statistic. For
the 200 acquirers making all-cash bids, 59 percent had positive abnormal returns256Julian R. Franks, Robert S. Harris, and Cohn Mayer
inmonth 0, whereas only 46 percent of the 442acquirersinall-equitybids had
positive abnormal returns in that month. We also calculated a t-statistic defined
as the mean abnormal return divided by the standard error of the mean. For
month 0 this produced t = 2.99 in all-cash bids and t = —2.14 in all-equity
bids.
9. In our U.K. sample over 90 percent of the acquisitions took a form similar
to that for the U.S. tenders (see Franks and Hams l986a), the remaining 10
percent having been schemes of' arrangement that required a shareholders'
meeting convened under a court's direction. In schemes of arrangement the
merger can be consummated if more than 75percentof the votes cast by those
present and voting are in favor of the proposal. Because of the relatively small
number of schemes of arrangement, any differences in results for this type of
merger are not likely to have a large effect on our U.K. results. Nonetheless,
we partitioned our U.K. data into schemes of arrangement that were all-cash
bids and those that were all-equity bids. The target bid premia were significantly
lower in all-equity bids than in all-cash bids.
10. For example, the merger is combining two firms and hence may change
the business mix of the acquirer (but see notes c and dof table 8.9). In addition,
a cash offer may be accompanied by an increase in financial leverage, thus
increasing risk. Providing some support for this is the fact that in all-cash offers
the postmerger 13 (1.04) exceeded the premerger 13 (.99).
11. We also examined use of a value-weighted market index in measuring
postmerger performance in the United States. Using an a = 0, 13 = 1.0 model
with a value-weighted index, we found all-cash acquirers had positive (.06)
abnormal returns over the 24-month period (t = 1.71), whereas all-equity
acquirers still displayed significant negative postmerger performance (of .111,
= —5.54). To further examine the role that firm size may play in postmerger
performance in the United States, we subdivided the sample into quintiles and
measured the postmerger performance of each portion. The smallest acquirers
appeared to outperform the largest acquirers when we used both a market









= 195 Postmerger Market Model
I Smallest — .078 .009 N = 153
2 —.102 .030 N=l64
3 —.135 .063 N= 169
4 —.194 —.104 N=165
5 Largest — .174 — .098 N = 145
12. One possible explanation for our postmerger performance results may
be related to size effects not captured in our formation of control returns (see
Dimsort and Marsh 1986). We have some evidence suggesting, however, that
such size effects cannot fully explain our results. First, as shown in table 8.4,
in the United States the average size of all-equity and all-cash acquirers was
quite similar both before and after merger. In the United Kingdom all-cash
acquirers were larger than all-equity acquirers. As a result, we cannot explain
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ids had their being larger than the all-cash acquirers. Second, our use of postmerger
lefined parameters (a andshould capture, at least in part, changes in a firm's return-
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merger Comment Artur Raviv
Franks, Harris, and Mayer document several very interesting empirical
regularities in the means of payment offered in takeovers. The most
id man- striking results are:
ed.
1. The percentage of all-cash offers in the United States increased over
tment in time, from none in 1955—59 to 58 percent in 1980—84. At the same
•tmouth time, all-equity offers declined from 76 percent to 22 percent.
2. The United Kingdom demonstrated the reverse pattern of changes
iergers over those years.
igs:An 3. About one-sixth of the acquisitions in the sample were through a
tender offer. Nontender, or "friendly," acquisitions are those ob-
ceand tamed by an approving board of directors. The appreciation to the
Th targets of tender offers was higher than to those in nontender
) C acquisitions.
an and This paper can be best viewed as a fact-finding mission. Although
ondon the authors survey several propositions that might explain the empirical
regularities, no simple theory can account for all the facts simulta-
s: The neously. I would find it much easier to evaluate the results if a coherent
ersity. model had been constructed and then tested by the empirical results.
iarket. Obviously, this would not be an easy task since the problem attacked
ournal bythe authors is at the core of the unsolved problems in corporate
finance: capital structure, taxation, and corporate control.
er-firm In the remainder of my comments I would like to propose an alter-
'54. native model, which in my view is capable of explaining many of the
paper results given by the authors. This model has been developed by Michael
stitute Fishman in a working paper entitled "Preemptive Bidding and the Role
tation. of the Medium of Exchange in Acquisitions." Here the key economic
difference between a cash offer and an offer of securities is that the value
of a cash offer is independent of the future profitability of the acquired
target, while the value of a securities offer is not. The willingness to offer
or accept a given package of securities may indicate something about
the information held by the bidder and the target. In particular, if target
managers possess private information regarding the profitability of their
firm, they will want to use this information in making their decisions
Busi- whether to accept a securities offer since the value of this offer depends
is: An on the future profitability of the target. Thus, securities offers are a means
Na- of making an offer contingent on the target's information. In Fishman's
model a bidder learns about the profitability of the target, and if his val-
uation is high, makes a high, preemptive bid in order to eliminate po-
tential competition. This bid is in the form of cash. If the bidder's
nt 12: Artur Raviv is the Harold L. Stuart Professor of Finance and Managerial Economics
at the J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.260Julian R. Franks, Robed S. Harris, and Colin Mayer 261
valuation is lower, he will make a securities offer, which will induce In Jensen
efficient accept/reject decision on the part of the target but may also explain th
induce competitors to join the bidding for the target. mergers.
The results that can be obtained from such a model are: premiums
managers I. Cash offers are more frequent in tender offers than in nontender
d offers. In tender offers target managers do not use their information persua e
and therefore there is no need for equity payment. Equity is used ecse
in the case of nontender offers. particular 2. Cash offers are higher on average than equity offers. Equity signals ries of lower value and induces competition. The o 3. The postmerger performance of the bidder, if the initial offer is for to cash, is better than if the initial offer is for equity. takeover
4. The postmerger performance for tender offers (which tend to be for restructu cash) is better than that for nontender offers (which tend to be for The ba
equity). As a cor
These results are consistent with the Franks, Harris, and Mayer this is no
evidence. Additional results implied by Fishman's model and which theory 0:
could be tested by the authors are: theories
I. Competing bidders appear more frequently in equity offers than in
simplete
cash offers. is
2. Target management will more frequently reject an equity offer than It is
a cash offer. theor
3. Rejecting an equity offer will result in a reduction in the value of theoryo
the target's shares, since it indicates that the target's managers of theor
believe the target is not as valuable now as it was, from the
It would be interesting to find out whether these results can be sup- Instead,
ported by the data the authors have analyzed. interesti
The r
huge an
Comment Richard S. Ruback offer da
years
Empirical evidence shows that the benefits of takeovers to the target's The f
shareholders are large in mergers and even larger in tender offers. B, the
Although mergers and tender offers are substitutes, there are some
general differences in the two types of takeover methods:
Tender Offers Mergers
Process Through shares Through management
Perception Hostile Negotiated
Payment Cash Stock This ra
exchan
Richard S. Ruback is associate professor of finance at the Alfred P. Sloan School of statisti
Management,Massachusetts Institute of Technology; a visitingassociate professorat ian theHarvard Business School; and a research associate of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research. hinges261Means of Payment in Takeovers
ducean In Jensen and Ruback (1983) we focused on the process difference to
also explain the larger measured average returns in tender offers than in
mergers. Truncation bias could explain the higher measuredaverage
premiums in tender offers. Low-value merger bids that are rejected by
managers do not become hostile tenders because it is more costly to
ntender persuade shareholders in hostile deals than in negotiated deals and
rmation because hostile deals are more expensive.
is used Franks, Harris, and Mayer emphasize the payment differences. In
particular, they try to use theories of capital structure choice and the-
signals ones of takeovers simultaneously.
The good part of this approach is that different takeovers do seem
is for to involve different financing schemes, so that the measured effects of
takeovers may include factors that are caused purely by the financial
o be for restructurings involved.
) be for The bad part of this approach is that it layers ignorance on confusion.
As a corporate finance person who works in both areas, I am afraid
Mayer this is not a pleasant admission. Unfortunately, we have no accepted
•which theory of the choice of takeover method. In contrast, we have many
theories about capital structure choice. But none has survived even
simple tests. And the interrelations among the many theories are ob-
than in scure at best. Saying that the state of the art in capital structure choice
is confused would be generous.
er than It is hard to fault the authors of this paper for the confusion of the
theory. My complaint is notthatthe authors fail to develop a new
a ue theory of capital structure and merger choice. I am mentioning the lack
inagers of theory at the outset because it locates and defines what we learn
from the authors. Their paper does not really test any particular theory.
be sup- Instead, it makes perhaps a bigger contribution by providing numerous
interesting facts.
The magnitude of the data collection and integration in this paper is
huge and competently done. The sample contains merger and tender
offer data for both the United States and the United Kindgom over the
years 1955—85,includingabout 2,000 observations.
arget S The facts that I find most interesting are in table 8.7. There, in panel
offers. B, the event month abnormal returns are:
some
Cash tenders 28%N = 135
Cash nontenders 24%N = 340
Equity tenders 20%N =29
•nent Equity mergers 11%N = 548
This ranking suggests that both the type of offer and the medium of
exchange are important. The regression tests provide an affirmative
chool of statistical test of this proposition.
I cannot resist the temptation to explain the rankings. My hypothesis
hinges on asymmetric information. Accept the Jensen and Ruback view262 JulianR. Franks, Robert S. Harris, and Cohn Mayer 263Me
that the market for corporate control involves competition between s comple
management teams for the rights to manage corporate resources. You that viola
would then expect most takeovers to be proxy fights.' But this is not
true. Why? Because these contests require very "management smart"
investors—investors that can evaluate the plans of competing man-
agement teams. Stockholders are unlikely to have the expertise or Referenc
incentives to evaluate the plans accurately. Indeed, clever stockholders Jensen
are efficient risk bearers: They hold a well-diversified portfolio and control:
cannot remember the names of the firms in the portfolio, never mind 50.
how they should be managed. Ruback,
What's a poor potential competing manager to do? Get somebody control
smarter to make the decision or simplify the decision. If target man-
agers are cooperative, then a merger is more likely. And the range of
payment types possible expands because the target managers certify
to the shareholders that the takeover is a good deal.
But suppose the target management decides to oppose the merger.
Also assume the deal is worthwhile to the bidder even if it becomes
hostile. Then the offer has to be simplified. Bidders should use secu-
rities that are easy to value—like cash.
In short, the same forces that make some takeovers mergers instead
of tender offers also make most tender offers cash transactions and
most mergers stock transactions. This means that, as with any set of
correlated variables, the attribution of results to particular variables is
very risky.
The facts that confuse me the most are in table 8.8. It shows that
there were significant negative abnormal returns in the two years fol-
lowing the offer. The returns were about —17percent in the United
States. I have been confused about this issue because we included a
table of postmerger performance in Jensen and Ruback (1983) that had
similar results. At the time I was convinced the results were due to
selection bias or some simple statistical malfunction. Franks, Harris,
and Mayer use almost all mergers, and so the selection bias argument
now seems less plausible. They also use different specifications and
get similar results. Reluctantly, I think we have to accept this result—
significant negative returns over the two years following a merger—as
a fact.
Accepting the fact does not mean I have to accept the explanation
given. I do not believe there is an explanation for this phenomenon
that is consistent with market prices, including the information in the
Wall Street Journal. We finance folks call it semistrong market effi-
ciency. Economists use the label rational expectations. Whatever you
call it, this finding can be used to make money. I can tell when a merger
I.Thisconceptualframework is explained in more detail in Ruback (1984).263Means of Payment in Takeovers
betwee completed. I can sell short. That gives me supernormal returns. And
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